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A METAPHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON THE
ARISTOTELIAN AND KANTIAN TREATMENTS OF TIME

A

CONSTANT DANGER which besets anyone who
endeavors to compare the doctrine of two philosophers
on a single topic is that he might station himself at
the attitude-perspective on one of the philosophers and criticize
the other purely in terms of this vantage point. I£ criticizing
one system or philosopher from the vantage point of another
system or philosopher is not the prime reason for the seemingly
irreconcilable rifts between philosophical schools, it at least
contributes to these rifts. And very often, like the yankee in
a foreign country, the philosophers must end up pointing at
things or inventing terms on the spur of the moment, in order
to make themselves understood, if possible, in lieu of the
" language " of the strangers.
In this article I will, of course, try to avoid "negativity" in
the sense of argumentativeness. Does this imply that I will
attempt to view the doctrines of Kant and Aristotle from
above, as it were? Perhaps, more precisely, from between the
both of them. From this " position" I would like to set myself
the task, not of locating logical identities, nor of finding mathematically exact congruences, but merely of observing general
symmetries in the doctrines of the two men on a specific topic.
The fact that one presupposes that such symmetry can be
found might, of course, suggest an a priori bias towards oversimplification. But if he analyzes the writings of both philosophers and happens to notice a notable similarity of content
represented under notably different forms, this would seem to
be a case of "a posteriori observation" in the domain of
philosophy. That is, the "observation" of attitudes and an
attempt to draw unified conclusions from these observations.
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But i£ this be a valid approach, it would certainly be naive
and undisciplined unless there were first a realization o£ the
definite, solid differences in the viewpoints o£ the two authors
in question. Therefore, before we examine the symmetries,
mention should be made o£ the differences (£or without the
differences, symmetry would not be there, only identity):
Three major differences might be noted in the philosophies
o£ Aristotle and Kant:
1) Aristotle set out to describe the physical world, going on
the fundamental presupposition that the world was, indeed,
intelligible. What was then necessary, upon this presupposition, was to make its potential intelligibility something actual,
to bring its latent forms out into the open-in words, in
concepts; and then, by a logical analysis o£ the properties o£
actual, intelligible form, to develop a metaphysics/ which, once
made explicit, would in turn lend definiteness and clarity to
the physical world in a semi-autonomous way. But Kant's
interests lay not so much in describing and delimiting the
physical world, as in setting proper bounds to man's faculty o£
reason. Under impetus o£ the faith that he could best serve
science and philosophy by accurately determining, once and £or
all, just what man could know and not know, and the various
ways in which he could be related to the knowable, and the
various ways in which he could be deceived as to the pseudoknowable, he set himself to accomplish a more "introverted "
task. His starting point was reflection, and his goal the exploration o£ the faculty o£ reflection: reason. And therefore it is
significant that, while Aristotle developed a system o£ categories o£ physical being, Kant developed a system o£ categories
by means o£ which we must think.
2) In consonance with his concentration upon the domain
o£ pure reason, Kant was primarily interested in solving the
major problems raised by that ambiguous zone where subjective and objective meet; that is, the zone where intuitions
1

Cf. Physics, II, 2, 194b; I, 9, 192a.

TREATMENTS OF TIME

119

are unified in concepts, or where ideas, rightly or wrongly,
are given determinate phenomenal reference as content. In
terms of his solutions to these problems, he also arrived at the
corollary conclusion that we can know nothing about the
positive reality of a substance behind phenomena, or a " thingin-itself," although we must presuppose some such reality because of the exigencies of our logical processes. Kant seems to
think that Aristotle also held, at least implicitly, an analogous
notion about matter, that is, that matter was a substratum
which had to be presupposed for appearances and that the
necessity which was ascribed to matter was a merely logical
necessity. 2 And such a notion may, indeed, be implicit in, e. g.,
the dictum of Aristotle that the " intelligible in act " is equivalent to the "intelligence in act." But explicitly, Aristotle
always seems to treat of intelligible matter as something
positive 3 and existing-in-itsel£.4
3) Kant, seeming to go on the presupposition that a philosophical system can only be complete and lucid when it is
deduced in a manifestly unified way, looks upon Aristotle's
system of categories as "defective." For Aristotle seems to
have "merely picked them up as they came his way," 5 not
proceeding on the basis of any predetermined unifying method,
but purporting to find by experience a complete set of objectively different types of things in the physical world. But
Kant proposes for himself the task of overcoming the deficiencies of such a " haphazard " method by exploring the basis
for all distinction and "objective" differentiation, namely, the
mind's operations of judgment. And thus his system will give
2 Critique of Pum Reason (N. Y.:
St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 516; (A 616;
B 644) . All references to Kant's first critique in the body of this study will be to
the 1781 and 1787 editions (A and B editions) . References to the A and B
pagination are given in the Meiner German edition and in St. Martin's Press
English Edition, both of which were used in the preparation of this article. Thus
the A and B citations can be indirectly used to find texts in these two editions.
"Physics, I, 9, 19~a; Aristotle sharply differentiates his position here from that of
Plato, who looked upon matter as privation per se.
• Ibid., I, 6, 190a; also I, 9, 192a.
5 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 114; Meiner ed., S. 119 (A 81; B 107).
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rise to a priori certainty and absolute comprehensivity, while
Aristotle's would have only a tentative a posteriori certainty,
i. e., a probability subject constantly to revision.
Thus Kant takes as his starting point the inexorable laws
of logic, proceeds to describe the world of pure reason in terms
of the categories of thought, and also gives special attention to
the problematics of the subjective-objective no-man's-land of
" appearance." Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to take
physical facts as his starting point, and thereupon to describe
the changing and unchanging aspects of the physical world,
even striving to deduce a set of empirically comprehensive
categories of objective types of physical being.
The recognition of these polar differences puts us in a position now to examine the " symmetries " in the doctrines of
the two philosophers in regard to the subject of time.
SYNTHETICAL CoMPARISON oF THE DocTRINES oF
KANT AND ARISTOTLE

For purposes of clarity I will in the following section present
various pivotal notions of Kant in regard to time in the
form of theses, and then elaborate on the corresponding " symmetrical " positions which seem to be implicit or explicit in
Aristotle. Kant's theses, however, it should be noted, will be
used only as a springboard for division of the subject under
consideration and not as a criterion in terms of which judgment is passed on Aristotle.
1) The Subjective Aspect of Time:
THESIS: TIME IS A SUBJECTIVE FORM A PRIORI WHICH
CANNOT BE THOUGHT OF AS ABSENT AND WHICH SUPPLIES
THE APODEICTIC CONDITIONS FOR ALL RELATIONS OF CONTRADICTORILY OPPOSED PREDICATES IN SCIENCES OF MOTION AND ALTERATION WITHOUT GOING SO FAR AS TO GIVE
THEM THE DETERMINATE UNITY OF A CONCEPT. (Critique of
Pure Reason, A 31, B 46)

Aristotle does not say explicitly that time is a fundamentally subjective notion. He does, however, raise the question as
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to whether there could be such a thing as time in the absence of
a human subject, i. e., a knowing soul.6 And he comes to the
conclusion that time in such a case would exist as measurable 7
(i. e., as potential) within motion, provided that motion itself
could be said to exist under such conditions. Such a hypothetical conclusion, although it does imply that time under
such conditions would probably be nothing actuai,B nevertheless does not opt for any preeminence of the " subjective "
nature of time, especially in the Aristotelian framework, where
the potential and the empirical are not prejudged for epistemo-logical reasons to be less important than the actual and the a
priori. But we can say that Aristotle recognizes the fact that
time is quite subjective in nature, without going so far (as did
Kant) to emphasize the subjective over the objective aspect.
Likewise, Aristotle gives us an indication that time in its
subjective aspect is not a determinate concept (universal
" form ") , since the formation of all intellectual concepts must,
according to him, take place outside of time. 9 And without
saying that it is a "form of sensibility" he does indicate that
it is applicable only to a special sphere of existence, i. e., the
realm of passing phenomena, of physical transmutation.
2) Its Foundation in Internal Perception:
THESIS: TIME IS A MOST GENERAL INNER DETERMINATION WHICH WE GIVE TO ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND IS
INDEED THE RESULT OF THE SUCCESSION OF THESE REPRESENTATIONS BEING INTIMATELY APPROPRIATED THROUGH
THE EMPIRICAL SELF OF CONSCIOUSNESS. (Critique of Pure

Reason; 10 A 33, B 49)

The fact that our awareness of time is somehow linked up
with our perception of the empirical processes or motions of
• Physics IV, 14, 223a.
7 Cf. Randall, Aristotle (N. Y.:
Columbia University, 1960), p. 202.
8 Cf. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (N. Y.: Doubleday Image, 1962), Vol.
6, Part II, p .65.
• Cf. Mure, Aristotle, p. 214.
1 ° Cf. also Collins, History of Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee:
Bruce,
1961)' p. 481.

1Q2

HOWARD P. KAINZ

our consciousness is recognized in a negative way by Aristotle
when he states that when we are unconscious in sleep, etc., time
"ceases" with respect to us. 11 He puts the matter in a more
positive way when he says that, in a completely dark room, we
garner the perception of the passage of time precisely by
noticing the movements of our own mind. 12 The necessary and
sufficient condition for our subjective ascription of time to
events would seem, then, to lie in some minimal awareness of
the alterations in our phenomenal self, through proprioception.
But again, whereas in Kant such an inner determination is
described as a (subjective) form of sensibility, in Aristotle it
is referred to as a "common sensible" (i.e., an objective type
of sensible form), which results ultimately from the perception
of alteration as a subjective process.13
3) Its Interconnection with Space:
THESIS: TIME, AS THE IMMEDIATE CONDITION OF INNER
APPEARANCES, IS ALSO MEDIATELY THE CONDITION FOR
OUTER (SPATIAL) APPEARANCES AND THUS SUPPLIES THE
GENERAL FORM OR CONTEXT IN TERMS OF WHICH ALL
APPEARANCE WHATSOEVER MUST BE PERCEIVED. (Critique
of Pure Re(J)3on, A 34, B 50)

Aristotle does not, of course, stress the a priori character of
time. But in consonance with his more " empirical " point of
view, he does point out a definite and intimate connection of
space (the potential serial infinity of continuous magnitude) 11
and time (the potential measurability, or numerability, of
spatial motion) . We are speaking here, of course, of time as a
" material " numberable, and not as the formal enumeration.
Physics, IV, 11, ~ISh.
Ibid., IV, 11, ~19a.
13 Cf. Mure, Aristotle
(London: Benn, 1932), pp. 110, 111, who says, "[the
perception of alteration] is thus a psychical miniature which enables us to gauge
an external magnitude or duration, and the implication is that we compare the
two terms and infer the outer from the inner." (He bases this conclusion on De
Anima, Ill, ~. 4~6b, and II, 9, 4~1a; on Physics, IV, 11, ~l8b, and on Mem. et
Remin., ~. 45~b.)
10 Cf. Ross, Aristotle (London:
Methuen, 1949), p. 84.
11

12
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And it is with regard to time in this connotation that Aristotle
says,
What is moved is moved from something to something, and all
magnitude is continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the
magnitude. Because the magnitude is continuous, the movement
too must be continuous, and if the movement, then the time. 15
Movement-in-space is thus a kind of "middle term " between
space and time. The movement takes on the character of the
continuous extensivity which supplies its material condition.
And just as the continuous extensivity is divisible ad infinitum,
so also the movement which is founded upon it is numerable
ad infinitum. And it is precisely the numerability of motion
that gives it the material character of time. 16 Time is thus,
in this sense, a new potentiality which is discerned within
continuous motion, i.e., a latent attribute subject to perception
and intellectual actualization by a human subject:
Time ... is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous [that is, motion].17
As Ross puts it, the multiple, spatially perceptible events in
the world are capable of taking on the attribute of " time,"
insofar as a single character of " nowness " can be attached to
the multiplicity of them. And this attribution of "nowness "
is indeed possible, insofar as each numerically single body is
passing through a succession of points (geographical points,
points of qualitative degree, or points of measurable size)
which is capable of coinciding with the succession of points of
movement of other bodies. 18
In summary, we can say that, for Kant, space was inseparably interconnected with time (the formal a priori condition of space); for Aristotle, on the other hand, time is
inseparably interconnected with space (the material substratum of time) .
Physics, IV, 11, 219a.
Ibid., IV, 11, 219b; 220a.
17 Ibid., IV, 11, 220a.
18 Cf. Ross, Aristotle, p. 90.
15

16
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4) Its Infinity:
THESIS: TIME IS INFINITE AS AN INDEFINITE REPRESENTATION (C. P. R., A 32, B 48) PRIOR TO THE DISCRETE ARITHMETICAL NUMBERING OF APPEARANCES (Prologomena, para. 9
and 10)-SUCH THAT IT CAN BE RENDERED PRECISELY
QUANTITATIVE ONLY THROUGH THE "AXIOMS OF INTUITION" OF THE UNDERSTANDING. (C.P.R., A 162, B 203) IT
IS ALSO "ETERNAL," AS A COSMOLOGICAL IDEA. (C. P. R.,
A 426, B 454)

To say that time is "infinite " and that it is " eternal " is
much the same thing, except that the former term refers
mainly to time's formal indeterminacy, while the latter term
refers primarily to the deficiency of precise limits in its cosmic
content (the series of appearances or events in the world).
Aristotle, as Kant, comes to the conclusion that time is both
infinite and eternal. But by a quite different procedure.
There is no such thing as an actual infinity in any kind of
magnitude, according to Aristotle/ 9 But we can discern potential infinities with regard to space, number, and time. Space
is potentially infinite insofar as it is divisible according to an
infinite convergent series; number, insofar as it is augmentable
according to an infinite divergent series. Time, on the other
hand, is infinite in both ways, i. e., infinitely divisible in that
it has a continuum of spatial magnitude as its bedrock of
content 20 and infinitely augmentable in that it is, formally
speaking, an active numbering produced by the power of
thought. 21 Thus time is a potential infinity both materially,
i. e., as continuous magnitude potentially divisible by " nows "
which are always different/ 2 and formally, i. e., as a product
of numbering thought, which is an " active " type of potentiality.23 But both the passive potentiality of the continuum
and the active potentiality of thought are due to the subjective
Physics, II, 6, 206a.
Physics, III, 7, 207b; IV, 12, 220a.
21 Ibid., III, 8, 208a. For the above general analysis of infinity in space, number,
and time, cf. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 83-85.
•• Cf. ibid., IV, 13, 22a; IV, 11, 219a.
23 De Anima, II, 5, 417b.
19
20
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capacities of man, who does the dividing or the numbering.
And so we might say that in both aspects of time it is the
infinite variety of possible subjective variations of objective
content that gives rise to the " potential infinitude " of time,
Thus Aristotle and Kant, though widely divergent in their
approaches, seem to be much at one in discerning the character
of infinity in the subjective representation of time.
Likewise with Aristotle" eternity," or an eternal time, results
when the formal attribute of temporality is attributed to the
whole series of cosmological events in our experience. 24 For
when we consider this series, it is impossible to form the conception of an absolute beginning with no antecedent or au
absolute end without succession, and so we are led by reductio
ad absurdum to posit an eternity of time. 25 This is the same
general line of reasoning which Kant follows in presenting the
" antithesis " of an eternal world as an insoluble problem m
the first antinomy of cosmological ideas. 26
5) Its Role in Statements of Existence:
THESIS: TIME IS THE REGULATIVE MEANS BY WHICH THE
UNDERSTANDING GIVES TO APPEARANCES THE FORM OF
DETERMINATE EXISTENCE THROUGH THE "ANALOGIES OF
EXPERIENCE" (Prologomena, para, 26; C. P. R., A 32, B 49) AND
INDEED IS THE CONDITION FOR ALL PREDICATION OF EXISTENCE. (C.P.R., B 71)

It is Aristotle's doctrine that the sphere of time is co-terminous with the sphere of the physically existent and the
physically possible, i. e., of things which are capable of some
kind of physical transience and which are capable of being
and not-being in succession. 27 More precisely, time is the cause
or condition of that type of existence of which alone we have
experience-transient existence in this world. 28 All of our
thoughts must refer in some way to such existence-in-time.
Physics, III, 6, 206a; IV, 18, 22b.
Ibid., VIII, I, passim.
26 Critique of Pure Reason, p. 897 ff. (A 427, B 455).
27 Physics, IV, 12, 22lb; 222a.
28 Ibid., IV, 12, 221b; IV, 18, 222b.

24
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As Aristotle puts it,
We cannot exercise the intellect on any object absolutely apart
from the continuous, or apply it even to non-temporal things unless
in connection with time. 29

Thus, not only when we make a judgment such as " x exists "
but also when we make a judgment of the general form "x is
y "-and even where x and/or y is (are) non-temporal ideas (s)
or separate substance (s) -the judgment cannot be made without some reference to some experience definitely situated in
time. And so also, if there be any " truth" in our judgments,
this cannot obtain without some relationship to the continuum
of time. 30
6) Time's Unification in and Through Consciousness:
THESIS: OUR INTUITION OF TIME, BY MEANS OF THE
SCHEMATA OF THE IMAGINATION, (0. P. R., A 138, B 177) IS
SUBORDINATED NATURALLY TO OUR UNITY OF APPRECEPTION, WHICH IS THE PRIOR CONDITION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF
THE EMPIRICAL IN GENERAL, (0. P. R., A 343, B 68, 401, 422)
AND (IN THIS SUBORDINATE ROLE) GOVERNS THE APPLICATION OF THE CATEGORIES OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO THE
WORLD OF APPEARANCE. (0. P.R., A 138, B 177)

In Metaph., IV, 6, 31 Aristotle criticizes Heraclitus and other
epistemological relativists who say that all true being and
beings are merely their own contingent and relative perceptions
of things. In doing this, argues Aristotle, they imply that they
themselves have no unity of being, but are, rather, discrete
multiplicities. For if all objects of knowledge differ only relationally, i.e., insofar as they have a different relationship to
the knower, then the knower himself must be a different correspondent term for every object which is related to him (just
as an object which is double, and triple, and equal can only be
so insofar as it is related to a different term under each of
these aspects) .
29

3

De M em. et Remin., 450a.

° Cf. Metaph.,

31

IX, 9, 105lb; also, De Anima, III, 6, 480a.

Cf. loc. cit., lOll b.
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Thus although Aristotle does not point explicitly to any
" unity of apperception" as a positive attribute of intellective
consciousness, he does take such unity for granted in arguing
against those who by their own doctrines are forced to conceive
consciousness as a series of discrete, non-related states or
motions. And since time is perceived in a primary way through
the motions of one's own consciousness, it would be implied
that it is subsumed in a immediate manner into the higher
unity of intellective consciousness, for the purpose of rendering
judgments of physical reality possible.
7) Its All-Inclusive Unity:
THESIS: ALTHOUGH WE CAN THINK DISTINCT TIMES IN
SUCCESSION, ALL THESE TIMES ARE MERELY DETERMINATIONS OF ONE ALL-PERVASIVE, ALL-INCLUSIVE, GENERAL
TIME, WHICH IS NOT A DETERMINATE ABSTRACT CONCEPT
BUT AN INDETERMINATE FORMAL CONDITION OF REFERENCE TO THE PHENOMENAL WORLD. (C.P.R., A 32, B 47)

As we might expect, Aristotle attributes such all-inclusive
unity to time as a quasi-material substratum rather than as a
formal condition:
According to him, time as numerable-i. e., as the continuum
of motion which is measurable 32-is par excellence the cyclical
motion of the heavenly spheres, which proceed most regularly,
uniformly, predictably.33 But since there is a greater time
which measures all time and all existents, 34 we might reasonably say that the motion of the outermost sphere would be the
single numerable continuum giving rise to all numerability and
time in subordinate spheres. And, indeed, this one recurring
outer motion would be the primordial continuum giving rise
to the possibility of all actual time as the numbering of
motion. 35 As Randall says, the eternal circular motion of the
outer sphere of the universe is
•• Physics, IV, 12, 221a.

•• Ibid., IV, 14, 223b.
"'Ibid., IV, 12, 221b.
35

Physics, IV, 13, 222a.
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the common frame of reference for all temporal measurement,
since its number is best known, i. e., as primarily conditioning all
regularity whatsoever. 36
Thus, just as Kant from his idealistic vantage point sees time
as a unique form of sensibility containing in an indeterminate
way all particular, determinate times, so also Aristotle, with a
more objective orientation, sees it primarily as an attribute or
inherent possibility of the unique " outermost sphere" of the
universe.
8) Its Inapplicability to any " Transcendent" World:
THESIS: "ETERNITY" AS A PURELY TRANSCENDENTAL
IDEA IS WITHOUT REAL INTUITIVELY-GIVEN CONTENT OR
REFERENCE TO THE REALLY KNOWABLE WORLD OF TEMPORAL PHENOMENA. (C. P. R., A 641, B 669)

It should be noted that we are speaking here not of " eternal
time " as a cosmological idea but of eternity as an anthropomophically-conceived attribute of some metaphysical " necessary
being " or some metaphysical world. As such, it is a merely
negative concept and denotes the timelessness of a necessary
being, or of an ens realissimum, or of a separate substance, or
of an idea, or of a " moment " as created arbitrarily by a
numbering mind, or of an eternal principle whose denial results
in self-contradiction.
Aristotle states quite clearly that time neither measures nor
affects any such sphere of eternity or anything whose nature
is eternal in this strict, absolute sense of the word. 37 Time is
validly applicable only to the sphere of physical, corporeal
transience. It ceases to apply just short of the boundaries of
thought and the entities of thought. 38
Aristotle differs from Kant, of course, in that he posits a
metaphysical world of the prime mover and the unmoved
Randall, Aristotle, p. ~03.
Physics, IV, 1~, ~2la; ~~lb.
38 It should be noted, however, that, while time does not apply to these
boundaries, it is still the material means and context out of which such "boundaries" are formulated. (Cf. sect. 5, snpra)
36

37
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movers and the souls of the primary celestial self-movers in
each sphere 39 and the separable " active " intelligence in
man; 40 and in that he speaks of such " eternal " things as of
real entities. Kant, on the other hand, only admits the possibility of some such things, and the practical fact that we must
sometimes presuppose them, in order to give greater unity and
completeness to our knowledge. But whether such a "metaphysical " world be conceived as an actuality or as a bare,
empty possibility, it is granted by both philosophers that time
will be completely inapplicable to it. Neither of them will
admit of a monistic structure in which time and eternity can
somehow be identical.
CoNcLuSION

Just as two persons who begin at different sides of a room
would be apt to apply the terms, " right," "left," " front," and
" behind " in different ways to the same things, it would seem
that the different starting points of Kant and Aristotle-as
mentioned in the introduction-have led them to describe
certain selfsame attributes of time in different ways. Thus,
for instance, Kant sees time as a formal unity, while Aristotle
sees it as a unity in its material substratum of continuous
extension; both see it as interconnected with space, but Aristotle, unlike Kant, takes space as the starting point for this
insight; both see it as an infinity, but Aristotle designates it a
potential infinity of that which is actual and determinate, while
Kant designates it an actual infinity of that which is of its very
nature incomplete and contentless (the a priori form of
sensibility) ; and so forth.
One of the most notable things that can be discerned in the
unity-in-difference which prevails between Kant and Aristotle
on the subject of time is that the former is almost always
speaking about it in its formal aspect, while the latter is
•• Provided that such souls are taken as distinct in existence from the " unmoved
mover" of each sphere. It is not clear whether Aristotle can be interpreted in
this way.
•• De Anima, ill, 5, 4SOA.
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very often merely referring to it in its material or potential
aspect. Once this is understood, we have the key to a good
number of moot points which seem at first encounter to represent widely divergent opinions or solutions but then upon
further examination are found to be most conveniently reducible to poles of attitudinal bias.
HowARD
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